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THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) ON CANADIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW1 
 






With the advent of The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
the protection and enforceability of intellectual property rights will 
continue growing.  Canadians, like other citizens whose countries may 
adhere to this treaty, would notice major changes to the legal systems 
regulating their rights and obligations with respect to intellectual property.  
With respect to copyright law, by deciding to be a party of ACTA, 
Canada would be facing a true challenge of fulfilling its international 
obligations and at the same time preserving its carefully drawn copyright 
law and policy.  This paper argues that the impact of ACTA on Canadian 
copyright law would be noticeable; the proposed treaty would import into 
Canadian copyright law notions that are not in harmony with its purpose, 
provisions, and/or judicial interpretation.  Further, the paper argues that 
ACTA will be foremost in mind in the ongoing reform to the Copyright 
Act; this means, if ACTA is concluded and the reform to the Canadian 
Copyright Act fails, another unfulfilled international promise will be 
added to the shoulder of Canadian copyright policy makers, like the one 
pertinent to the WIPO Internet Treaties.  
                                         
1
 At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA 
was the most recent draft of the text.   Any references to ―the most recent text‖ and 
related analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft.   After this paper was submitted for 
publication, a new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010.  This paper may be 
revised by the author to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text.  
2
 Elizabeth F. Judge, Ph.D.,  Associate Professor,  Faculty of Law, Common Law 
Section, University of Ottawa.  
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Canada‘s participation in ACTA‘s negotiations has raised concerns 
amongst Canadian academics, politicians, public advocacy groups, and 
institutions and individuals interested in the copyright domain.  Most of the 
Canadian concerns share the criticism being voiced around the world on 
ACTA‘s undemocratic approach toward international intellectual property 
norm-setting and the prospective role of its norms in ratcheting up the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property.  Nevertheless, some 
concerns are specific to Canada; they are pertinent to the impact of ACTA 
on the balance that is diligently struck under the Canadian Copyright Act
3
  
and its judicial interpretation. Balance is the ultimate purpose under 
Canadian copyright law, the achievement of which requires avoiding 
overprotecting right holders at the expense of users, and concurrently 
recognizing the latter as rights holders. Thus, since ACTA is rights-holder 
oriented, many Canadians fear that the proposed treaty will reshape the 
Canadian Copyright Act and, thus, distort the balance that has been struck 
                                         
3
 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.  Constitutionally, Copyright falls within the 
jurisdiction of the federal legislator.  See s. 91(23) of Constitution Act, 1867, Department 
of Justice Canada <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html#pre>. 
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in copyright protection in Canada. To alleviate these concerns, the Canadian 
Industry Minister, Tony Clement, stated that ACTA will be ―subservient‖ to 
Canadian legislation, including the Copyright Act.
 4
  
This paper argues that the impact of ACTA on Canadian copyright law 
would be noticeable; the proposed treaty would import into Canadian 
copyright law notions that are not in harmony with the purpose of the 
Canadian copyright law, the status quo of Canadian copyright law, and the 
orientation of Canadian copyright jurisprudence.  Further, the paper argues 
that ACTA will be foremost in mind in the ongoing reform to the Copyright 
Act; this means if ACTA is concluded and the reform to the Canadian 
Copyright Act fails, another unfulfilled international promise will be added 
to the shoulder of Canadian copyright policy makers, like the one pertinent 
to WIPO internet treaties.  Canada is currently engaged in Phase Three of 
copyright reform, which focuses on digital copyright issues.  The 
advancement of technology and the country‘s treaty obligations were the 
impetus to a series of amendments to the Copyright Act, the latest of which 
was in 1997.  The challenges that the internet has brought to the field of 
copyright by establishing the need to expand the umbrella of protection to 
digital works, as evidenced by Canada being a signatory to the WIPO 
internet treaties, has necessitated further amendment to the Copyright Act.  
In June 2010, after two failed attempts in 2005 and 2008, the Canadian 
Government tabled Bill C-32:  ―An Act to amend the Copyright Act‖ to 
modernize the provisions of the Copyright Act in light of the contemporary 
technological advancements and, at the same time, to implement the WIPO 
Internet Treaties.  Despite the ongoing process to reform the Canadian 
Copyright Act the Canadian Government has not been discouraged from 
joining the negotiations of the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA).  Canada officially announced its intention to join the 
negotiations on October 23, 2007 and has been an active participant in all 
the negotiations rounds held since then. 
This paper is divided into two parts:  the first deals with the official 
claim of ACTA as an anti-counterfeiting and piracy agreement as well as 
the suspicions surrounding this claim.  The second part discusses the legal 
framework of ACTA and its impact on Canadian copyright law. 
 
II. ACTA:  AN OFFICIAL CLAIM AND A SUSPICION OF A NEW BATTLE 
 
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
                                         
4
Canadian Copyright Law to Trump ACTA (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/12/01/clement-copyright-acta-ndp.html. 
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(USTR), the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a proposed 
plurilateral agreement that aims to enhance the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and combat counterfeiting and piracy.
5
  Introducing an anti-
counterfeiting trade agreement was a Japanese idea, which overlapped with 
the desire of other like-minded countries for stronger enforceability of 
intellectual property rights as expressed in different initiatives, forums, and 
events.
6
  Initial discussions among the United States, EU, Canada, Japan, 
and Switzerland were carried out between 2006 and 2007, but the official 
launch of negotiations for the ACTA was in June 2008.
7
  The ongoing 
rounds of negotiations expanded to include more countries, such as 
Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea.
8
  
Some countries which participated in first rounds of the negotiations, 
specifically Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, have dropped out.
9
  
So far, there have been nine rounds of negotiations and the goal of the 
participating countries is to reach an agreement by the end of 2010.
10
  The 
tenth round of negotiations took place in Washington D.C. during the period 
                                         
5
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement - Summary of Key Elements under Discussion (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479 [hereinafter ACTA - Summary of Key Elements]. 
6
 See, e.g., The Second Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy:  
The Lyon Declaration (Nov. 15, 2005), 
http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Lyon/files/OutcomesStatement20051115.pdf 
(considering Japan‘s proposal for a new international treaty addressing counterfeiting and 
piracy); G8 Summit, Combating IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting, (St. Petersburg, Russia, 
Jul. 16, 2006), http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/15.html (reaffirming the group‘s commitment to 
fight piracy and counterfeiting);  Office of the U.S. IPR Coordinator,  Bush Administration 
Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (Sep. 2007), 
http://www.stopfakes.gov/pdf/Memo_STOP_Sheet_September_2007.pdf (The ―Stop!‖ 
initiative was launched by the Bush administration in 2004 to harmonize the efforts of a 
number of federal agencies and engage the American industry and the U.S. trading partners 
in strengthening  the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the U.S. and abroad); 
and European Commission Directorate General for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries (May. 5, 2005), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636.pdf (proposing a set of 
actions to overcome the problem of intellectual property violations).  For a complete 
account of ACTA‘s origins, see Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 
63 SMU L. REV. 4-7 (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624813.  
7
 See ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5; Ambassador Schwab 




 ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5. 
9
 EU ACTA Negotiator Confirms EU Wants Patent Provisions in ACTA (May 8, 
2009), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2009-May/004427.html; Charles R. 
McManis, The Proposed Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA):  Two Tales of a 
Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2009). 
10
 ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5. 
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of August 16-20, 2010.  In the first seven rounds of the negotiations, held 
between June 2008 and January 2010, officials of participating countries 
negotiated the treaty under an unprecedented veil of secrecy.
11
  No official 
text of the treaty was released, and the countries merely distributed a 
document summarizing the major elements being discussed under the 
treaty,
12
 and rejected the reliability of any leaked draft text of the treaty.
13
  
Nevertheless, the US and EU denied that the negotiations are intended to be 
secret, arguing that for efficiency reasons it is ―normal‖ and ―accepted 
practice‖ for the early stages of international negotiations treating economic 
matters not to be carried out in public and for negotiators to adhere to ―a 
certain level of discretion.‖
 14
  
The lack of transparency in ACTA‘s negotiations has triggered severe 
criticism from civil society and academics.
15
  At the official level, on March 
                                         
11
 Negotiators of ACTA agreed that all the documents exchanged in the course of the 
negotiations will be classified as ―Confidential Foreign Government Information.‖  See 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Memorandum for All Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiators (Feb. 8, 2008) 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/EFF_PK_v_USTR/maruyama_decl.pdf>.  Trying to get 
information on ACTA‘s negotiations, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Public 
Knowledge (PK) submitted a request to the USTR, under the Freedom of Information Act, 
seeking the release of records on the proposed treaty and the negotiations pertinent thereto.  
The request was ignored by the USTR and, as a result, the EFF and PK initiated a suit a 
against the USTR on September 17, 2008 requesting that the Court order the USTR to 
respond to their request.  See Electronic Frontier Foundation, FOIA: Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Sep. 17, 2008), http://www.eff.org/cases/eff-and-public-
knowledge-v-ustr; Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge v. Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (Civil Action 08-1599 (D.D.C.)) (Sep. 17, 2008), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=0a48a9c9-adea-4d21-b192-
2fe34a88412b.  Eventually, the EFF and PK dropped the suite on the ground that courts 
have little power to force the executive branch to release documents classified confidential 
on ―national security grounds,‖after the Obama‘s administration showed its support to the 
classification.  See EFF and Public Knowledge Reluctantly Drop Lawsuit for Information 
About ACTA (Jun. 17, 2009), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/06/17. 
12
 ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5. 
13
 European Commission, Fact Sheet:  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 23, 
2007) (Updated November 2008), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [hereinafter 
ACTA Fact Sheet]. 
14
 Id.; see alsoACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5; see contra ―ACTA is 
Secret. How Transparent are other Global Norm Setting Exercises?‖ (Jul. 21, 2009), 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf. 
15
 See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
CounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 247 (2009) (describing 
ACTA, due to its lack of transparency. as ―a black box that could contain a bomb‖); 
Michael Geist, ACTA Guide, Part Three: Transparency and ACTA Secrecy (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4737/125/ (summarizing the public concern over 
the secrecy of ACTA, identifying the sources of this secrecy, and arguing that secrecy is 
not the standard in the negotiations involving international norms setting); James Love, 
Transparency of FTAA Negotiations, Compared to ACTA (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://keionline.org/node/715 (arguing that it is not the standard to negotiation treaties in 
6 Impact of ACTA on Canadian Copyright Law  
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10, 2010, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling upon the 
European Commission to publicly reveal all documents pertinent to ACTA 
negotiations and to promote adherence to transparency with respect to the 
negotiations and their outcome.
16 
 The European resolution and the 
proliferation of leaks of ACTA documents, the most significant of which 




 motivated the negotiating countries to 
release an official draft text of the treaty after the eighth round of 
negotiations held in Wellington in April 2010.
18
  Unlike the leaked January 
text, the official draft of the treaty does not identify the positions of 
countries with respect to the controversial provisions; instead, each different 
proposition of the participating countries was left in square brackets without 
reference to the country to which this proposition belongs.  In the ninth 
round of negotiations held in Lucerne, Switzerland from June 28 to July 1, 
2010, the participating countries did not release a new draft of the treaty; 




ACTA‘s claimed purpose as a treaty against piracy and counterfeiting is 
surrounded by the suspicion that ACTA is merely a new battle to win the 
long going war over more absolute control of intellectual property. In this 
                                                                                                       
secret); Secret Counterfeiting Treaty Public Must be Made Public, Global Organizations 




 European Parliament, Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and State 
of Play of the ACTA Negotiations (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  The European Parliament had earlier called upon the 
European Commissioner to make available all the documents relating to ACTA‘s 
negotiations.  See Access to Documents:  The European Parliament Demands more 




 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft 







Rc3Yjsn5HuhcWw%3D%3D&attredirects=0  [hereinafter January Draft]. 
18
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public Predecisional /Deliberative Draft 
(Apr. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1883 [hereinafter Official Draft]. 
19
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft 
(Jul. 1, 2010), 
http://www.laquadrature.net/files/ACTA_consolidatedtext_EUrestricted130710.pdf 
[hereinafter July Draft] 
7 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-13 
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battle, industrial countries aim to achieve two goals:  ratcheting up 
international intellectual property protection and enforcement and, at the 
same time, opposing any user-oriented force.
20
  This suspicion is supported 
by a number of indications.  Foremost, industrial countries are negotiating 
ACTA as an intellectual property enforcement treaty despite their relatively 
recent success concluding the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights,
21
 the underlying agenda of which also ratchets 
up international intellectual property protection and enforceability.
22
  
Moreover, the U.S. and EU come to ACTA negotiations after achieving a 
―TRIPS-plus model‖
23
 of intellectual property protection and enforceability 
in a bundle of bilateral and regional trade agreements they negotiated and 
                                         
20
 Peter M Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property is Unbalanced, 
22 EIPR 309 (2000) (arguing that the international mechanism of intellectual property 
norm setting is designed to produce norms the purpose of which is mainly to serve the 
interests of rights holders, regardless of the associated societal detriments to societies). 
21
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments: Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
22
 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II:  Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 21 at p. 21 (2004) (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement is mainly designed to serve 
the interests of rights holders with little attention to the interests of users); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the 
Public Domain of Science, 7(2) J.Int'l Econ.L. 431 at p. 448 (2004) ( stating ―[t]o put it 
another way, because the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated with the goal of promoting 
international trade, the goals of substantive balance common to domestic intellectual 
property systems are barely discernible in its provisions‖); Frederick M. Abbott, The 
Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the World Trading System, (1998) 1(4) J.Int'l 
Econ.L. 497, at p. 499 (1998) (arguing that TRIPS is a global intellectual property regime 
that meets the interests of intellectual property industries in the developed world). Even 
prior to introducing TRIPS Agreement, industrial countries had sought to revise 
international intellectual property convention in order to expand the level and scope of 
intellectual property protection and enforceability, e.g., Berne convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works,  9 September 1886,  1161 U.N.T.S 31, (Completed at Paris 
on May 4, 1896, Revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 
20, 1914, and revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm 
on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971), see Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: 
Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 3 at p.7 (1988);  Ruth Okediji, 
Toward an International Fair Use doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 75 at pp. 104-105 
(2000). ―The minimalist nature of [hereinafter Berne Convention] obfuscated the real, if yet 
unrealized, triumph for high-protectionist states, namely that international copyright could 
only get stronger. High-protectionist countries, such as France, incurred short-term costs in 
not obtaining higher levels of protection at the Conventions' inception but, for the long 
term, the fact that there was an international agreement that, by its terms, contemplated 
future revisions to improve the system and make the rights more secure, was by far the 
most vital victory‖. 
23
 For Peter Drahos, a TRIPS-Plus model ―requires a Member to implement a more 
extensive standard; or [] eliminates an option for a Member under a TRIPS standard‖, see 
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4(6) JWIP 791 at p.793 
(2001).  
8 Impact of ACTA on Canadian Copyright Law  
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reached with other countries, largely developing nations.
24
  ACTA, 
therefore, is taking the international intellectual property regime into a new 
stage where the level of intellectual property protection and enforceability is 
described as ―TRIPS-Plus-Plus Model.‖
25 
  In sum, negotiating ACTA in the 
presence of TRIPS‘ global ―one-size-fit all‖
26
 mode of protection, which is 
backed by the enforceability mechanism of the WTO,
27
 and in the aftermath 
                                         
24
 See e.g., United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter United States-Jordan FTA]; United States-
Chile Free Trade Agreement, Jun. 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, May., 6 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, 
Jun. 15, 2004,  44 I.L.M. 544; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, Nov. 24, 1997, OJ L 129 of 15.05.2002. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the role bilateralism in the international intellectual 
property regime, see Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 
4(6) JWIP 791, at p. 803 (describing bilateralism as a major mechanism the U.S and the 
EU are utilizing to oblige developing countries to adhere to levels of  intellectual property 
higher than the standards required by multilateral instruments of intellectual property 
protection and warning developing countries that they are being led ―into a highly complex 
multilateral/bilateral web of intellectual property standards that are progressively eroding 
not just their ability to set domestic standards, but also their ability to interpret their 
application through domestic administrative and judicial mechanisms.‖ ); Ruth L. Okediji,  
Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 
UOLTJ 125 (2003-2004)  (arguing that bilateralism has always been a mechanism used in 
regulating international relations; however, while this old bilateralism tended to confer 
mutual benefits on both contracting members, the new bilateralism the United States is 
adopting now in its foreign trade relations resembles a regime shifting tactic that aims at 
developing an expansive intellectual property protection model free of the limitations 
required by the TRIPS Agreement). 
25
 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.  
26
 Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 827 at p. 832 
(2007); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46(4) 
Hous.L.R. 979 at p. 981 (2009); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of 
Intellectual Property, (9) Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0009 at pp.3-4 (2004). This one-size fit-all 
result was earlier warned against by PAUL A. DAVID, Intellectual Property Institutions 
and the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and 
History, in GLOBAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 19-61 at pp. (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen 
Mogee, and Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993) (Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 
1993) (showing pessimism with respect to the practicality of establishing a uniform 
international intellectual property system and predicting that the efforts to establish such a 
system may result in an IP regime suitable to serve the interests and policies of one or 
group of countries that are to be enforced on countries that don‘t have similar interests or 
policies) at pp. 54-55. 
27
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S.401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The DSU has been described as the ―teeth‖ that have overcome 
the enforceability difficulties that Berne Convention suffered from, see Laurence R. Helfer, 
9 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-13 
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of spreading TRIPS-plus model of protection and enforceability, makes it 
clear that ACTA is merely a further step toward more absolute control of 
intellectual property. 
Ratcheting up the international intellectual property protection and 
enforceability through ACTA involves the same technique of regime 
shifting by which industrial countries, lobbied upon by major industries, 
moved international intellectual property norm settings from WIPO to the 
WTO.
28
  Industrial countries have used regime-shifting again to produce 
tougher intellectual property protection standards through a net of bilateral 
and regional trade agreements.  Similarly, they are moving the international 
intellectual property regime to a ―club‖
29 
to which the number of invitations 
is limited.  ACTA‘s ongoing negotiations take place outside the known 
forums for intellectual property protection norm setting, such as WIPO and 
WTO, where a certain level of transparency, democracy and accountability 
is guaranteed.
30
  This led some commentators to believe that ACTA‘s 
                                                                                                       
Toward A Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 971, 
at pp. 984-985 (2007); DANIEL GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2nd ed. 2003) at p.124. 
28
 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, pp.14&20 (2004) 
(defining regime shifting as ―an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty 
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international 
venue to another‖, and stating the factors motivated developed countries to shift 
negotiating intellectual property norms from WIPO to WTO; there factors are: ―The first 
[factor] related to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by WIPO. The second 
focused on institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent 
intellectual property protection standards that these states favored.‖); SUSAN K.SELL, 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 96-120 ( 2003) (discussing the consensus amongst major 
industries in Japan, United States and EU on seeking an IP multilateral agreements and 
their input in the TRIPS negotiations). 
29
 Daniel Gervais, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforceability of 
Property Rights (World Trade Organization Panel, January 26, 2009) 103 AJIL 549, at p. 
555 (2009) (stating that ACTA‘s approach to international intellectual property norm 
setting is a ―‗club approach‘ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement 
‗membership‘ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade 
agreements.‖) 
30
 Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade 
Agreements, 35 YJIL Online 24 at P. 26 (2009); Robin Gross, On the Proposed Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at p.5. Many commentators 
had criticized moving the intellectual property norm setting from WIPO to the WTO; this 
criticism is also applicable to the issue of moving the issue of intellectual property 
enforcement to ACTA, see T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AND THE FUTURE (1998) (arguing that there was no real rational for dealing 
with intellectual property issues under the trade umbrella in light of the presence of the 
10 Impact of ACTA on Canadian Copyright Law  
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negotiations overlook the multilateral regime of IP norm setting in order to 
escape ―global accountability.‖
31
  By avoiding WIPO and WTO as norm-
setting forums, ACTA escaped potential opposition from developing 
countries on the governance of these organizations and the norms they 
produce.
32
  ACTA‘s negotiations are susceptible to more criticism giving 
the fact that the participating countries are mainly developed countries.  
While some developing countries have been invited to the negotiations, the 
major developing countries that possess a long history of negotiating 
intellectual property norms and advocating for a balanced IP regime have 
been left out.
33
  Even when the ACTA issue was raised in the G8 summits, 
Russia was left out of the discussion since it does not share the same 
perspective on the enforcement of intellectual property.
34
  The decision of 
the founders of ACTA to invite certain developing countries and to exclude 
others leads to three observations.  First, developed countries wanted to 
reach an agreement that reflects their own interests as net exporters of IP 
                                                                                                       
WIPO, the organization of the most relevant expertise); Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of 
TRIPS, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 143, at p. 183 (2007)  (arguing that the WTO is not the right 
forum for making intellectual property laws since no balance between rights holders and 
users can be achieved there due to the differences with respect to wealth ―within countries 
and between countries.‖) 
31
 The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade: Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy 




 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.; Margot 
Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement 
(ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at p. 247 (2009) ( describing the shift of norm setting from 
the WIPO and WTO as ―a form of international bullying‖).; Robin Gross, On the Proposed 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at pp. 5-6; Michael Geist, 
Canada‘s ACTA Briefing, Part One: ACTA Is A Response to WIPO Gridlock (Apr.6, 
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3830/99999/. 
33
 Robin Gross, On the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 
25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-
mar2008.pdf at p.2; Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
CounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at pp. 254-255 (2009). 
Professor Michael Geist reported that Brazil expressed its wish to join ACTA‘s 
negotiations to one of the negotiating countries, but Brazilian request had not received an 
answer, see Michael Geist, ACTA Update: New Meetings, New Partners, New Issues (Jun. 
30, 2009),  http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4092/408>; Ashutosh Jindal, adviser 
at the Embassy of India to the EU, stated that India had not been invited to ACTA‘s 
negotiations, see Intellectual Property Watch, Indian Official: ACTA Out Of Sync With 




 Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 63 SMU L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2010) at p. 6, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624813. 
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based works.  Secondly, at this stage, developed countries are not concerned 
about the number of countries joining the negotiations, for, as in the case of 
TRIPS, developed countries practically have enough mechanisms to impose 
these norms on other countries when the treaty is ready,
 
regardless of 
whether or not developing countries participated in the negotiations or agree 
with the outcome.
35
  Thirdly, by inviting specific developing countries to 
the negotiations, developed countries want to clean up the outcome of the 
treaty from the stigma of having been negotiated merely amongst developed 
nations.  Fourthly, the participating developing countries will play the role 
of promoting the convention in their regions.
36
 





  In their launch to ACTA‘s negotiations, developed 
countries have argued that ―counterfeit‖ and ―pirated‖ goods in international 
trade have been causing rights holders economic losses, hindering the 
sustainable development of both developed and developing countries, and 
risking consumers‘ safety; therefore, they argue, the solution is a new 
agreement embodying international cooperation toward stronger means of 
intellectual property enforcement.
38
  This argument shares many similarities 
with the reasoning that the United States and other developed countries 
publicized to introduce the TRIPS Agreement;
39
 however, the developed 
                                         
35
 Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
CounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at p. 250 (2009);
 
 Robin 
Gross, On the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), 
http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at 
pp.4-5. see (arguing that ACTA is ―undemocratic‖ and ―imperialistic‖ treaty since ACTA 
will ultimately  be imposed on countries that have not participated in the negotiations of its 
provisions, mainly developing countries.‖); see also, Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its 
Discontents, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 369 (2006) (providing four different narratives 
of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement: the bargain narrative, the coercion narrative, the 
ignorance narrative, and the self-interest narrative); Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights 
in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13(1) Prometheus 6, at p. 16 (1995) ( 
arguing that ―[t]he intellectual property story [including its TRIPS segment] is one of 
coercion, but it is economic rather than military in kind‖). 
36
 After the U.S signed its free trade agreement with Jordan, the U.S presented Jordan 
to the Arabic World as a role model that should be followed, see, e.g., U.S. – UAE Free 
Trade Agreement Press Conference (Mar. 8, 2005), 
http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/pr_10mar2005.html.  
37
 Peter Drahos defines ―framing‖ as ―a form of public dialogue in which actors 
wishing to change political processes offer an alternative conceptual scheme through which 
to reinterpret those processes‖, see Peter Drahos, Does Dialogue Make a Difference? 
Structural Change and the Limits of Framing, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 268 (2008). 
38
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement - Summary of Key Elements under Discussion (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479. 
39
 See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics 
of Intellectual Property,117 Yale L.J. 804, at p. 484  (2008) (describing the ―public 
interest‖ frame in which the American industry lobby presented the issue of intellectual 
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countries in ACTA are placing more emphasis on the ―security‖ and 
―safety‖ aspect of the enforceability issue.
40
  This framing tactic aims at 
generating public support and involving a network of actors, both national 
and international, private and public, in the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.
41
  An example of this network-based partnership toward 
stronger means of intellectual property enforcement is embodied in ―The 
Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy‖ launched in 
2004 to address the problem of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods as a 
health hazard and a source of funding for organized crime.  This conference 




The third technique that developed countries are using to ratchet up the 
international intellectual property law regime through ACTA is the floor-
based approach toward the levels of protection and enforcement provided 
under the proposed treaty.  The obligations of ACTA will reflect only a 
floor, not a ceiling, for enforcement of intellectual property rights, which 
means that countries are free to adopt stronger measures of enforceability.
43
  
The floor-without-a-ceiling approach toward the protection and 
enforceability of intellectual property rights reflects an infrastructural bias 
in the international intellectual property regime generally and ACTA 
specifically against users of intellectual property.
44
  It means that the regime 
does not seek to balance the interests of right holders and users of 
intellectual property, but instead impliedly welcomes the expansion of 
                                                                                                       
property protection in order to show the need for the TRIPS Agreement) 
40
 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.  
41
 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.; and The 
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade: Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy Implications, 
IQSensato's In Focus, Volume 2, Number 8  (Jun. 2, 2008) at p.6, 
http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/uploads/InFocus%20-ACTA%20-%20Vol%202%20-
Issue%208.pdf.;  Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual 
Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36  Case 
W.Res.J.Int‘l L. 53, at p.54 (2004)(arguing that ―nodal coordination of an international 
enforcement pyramid offers non-state actors the possibility of securing compliance by 
states with emerging global standard of intellectual property rights‖).  
42
 See, Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
http://www.ccapcongress.net/index.htm. 
43
 See, ACTA Official Draft, supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art.1.2(1); ACTA July Draft, 
supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art.1.2(1). 
44
 Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4(6) JWIP 791 
at p.798 (2001)(stating that integrating  a ―minimum standard‖ mode of protection in 
international intellectual property agreements is an element in the efforts toward ratcheting 
up the protection and enforceability of intellectual property). 
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intellectual property protection and enforceability.  This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that the treaty provides that it would only be 
concerned with enforcing existing intellectual property rights,
45
 but, on the 
other hand, the legal framework of the treaty would provide right holders 
with new substantive rights, such as in the case of the right to protect 
technological protection measures.
46
   
The second goal that industrial countries are looking for through ACTA 
is to oppose the recent success of developing countries to bring about the 
WIPO Development Agenda.
47
  The WIPO Development Agenda has 45 
recommendations categorized under 6 clusters (A-F).
48
  Under these 
clusters, some recommendations are well aware of the danger of excessive 
levels of copyright protection.  For example, Recommendation 10 calls for 
―making national intellectual property institutions more efficient‖ and 
―[promoting] fair balance between intellectual property protection and the 
public interest.‖  Recommendation 15 calls for WIPO‘s norm-setting to take 
into consideration ―different levels of development‖ and ―a balance between 
costs and benefits.  Further, recommendation 16 calls for ―the preservation 
of the public domain within WIPO‘s normative processes and deepen the 
analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public 
domain.‖  Recommendation 25 is also important as it calls for ―[promoting] 
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the benefit of developing 
countries and to take appropriate measures to enable developing countries 
to fully understand and benefit from different provisions, pertaining to 
flexibilities provided for in international agreements, as appropriate.‖  
Finally, Recommendation 45 calls for the ―societal interest‖ and the 
―development-oriented concerns‖ of developing countries to be taken into 
consideration when approaching intellectual property enforcement.  The 
same recommendation emphasizes that ―‗the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
                                         
45
 See, ACTA Official Draft, supra note X at ch.1, s.A, art.1.3(2); ACTA July Draft, 
supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art. art.1.3(2). 
46
 See, infra. 
47
 See, Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, General Report, Forty-Third Series 
of Meetings, Geneva, Sep. 24 to Oct. 3, 2007 (A/43/16), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_43/a_43_16-main1.pdf [hereinafter WIPO 
Development Agenda]. 
48
   Cluster A: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building; Cluster B: Norm-setting, 
flexibilities, public policy and public domain; Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge; Cluster D: 
Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies; Cluster E: Institutional Matters including 
Mandate and Governance; and Cluster F: Other Issues, see The 45 Adopted 
Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/agenda/recommendations.html. 
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technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and 
to a balance of rights and obligations,‘ in accordance with Article 7 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.‖  The WIPO Development Agenda is considered to be a 
continuation of developing countries‘ struggle to achieve a fair international 
intellectual property regime.
49
  The history of international intellectual 
property norm setting shows that industrial countries were usually reluctant 
to accept initiatives proposed to reform the international intellectual 
property regime in light of a development purpose.
50
  Thus, it is reasonable 




Similar to preceding battles to win more control over intellectual 
property, such as in TRIPS and TRIP-Plus regimes, ACTA would have a 
serious impact not only on developing countries and their citizens but also 
on the citizens of the industrial countries.
52
  ACTA will shift the cost of 
intellectual property enforcement from the shoulders of the rights holders of 
intellectual property rights to the shoulders of the public which ultimately 
would be required, through taxes, to finance the steps taken by authorities 
according to ACTA.
53
  Furthermore, the content of ACTA has been a 
concern for industrial countries‘ citizen rights and freedoms as much as it is 
for developing countries since the treaty includes provision that may impact 
fundamental freedoms available to individuals under intellectual property 
                                         
49
 Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 465 (2009) 
(arguing that the efforts taken by less-developed countries through advancing development 
agendas at the WIPO, WTO and other international foras to develop an innovation and 
intellectual property regime considerate of their development needs are ―remarkably 
similar‖ in motives and goals to their efforts taken between the period of 1960-1970). 
50
 E.g., when developing countries managed to introduce the Stockholm Protocol, 
developed countries failed the protocol by refraining from ratifying it, De Sanctis, The 
International Copyright Conventions, 14 Copyright 254, at p. 258 (1978); Peter Burger, 
The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 3, at p.20 
(1988). 
51
 See, Michael Geist, The ACTA Threat To The Future Of WIPO (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/14/the-acta-threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/ 
(arguing that ACTA poses a serious danger on the success of the WIPO Development 
Agenda). 
52
 See, Ruth L. Okediji,  Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection, UOLTJ 125, at p. 141 (2003-2004)(arguing that 
bilateralism expanded intellectual property protection and enforceability  ―at the expense of 
the public interest both in developed and developing countries.‖) 
53
 See, Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement 
(ACTA): Two Tales of A Treaty, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1235 at p. 1237 (2009); Robin Gross, On 
the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), 
http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at p. 
6. 
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law and other legal regimes.
54
  
Shortly after the launch of the treaty negotiations, scholars started to 
predict the content of the treaty and to evaluate its possible impact on the 
international intellectual property regime and on the national laws of other 
countries.  This research has continued with the official release and leaks of 
ACTA content.  In this vein, the next part of this paper evaluates the impact 
of the legal framework of the treaty on Canadian copyright law. 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF ACTA ON CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Canada‘s situation in the ongoing negotiations of ACTA is unique, as it 
is participating in the negotiations at the same time that it is carrying out a 
major reform to its Copyright Act.  Thus, the impact of ACTA, the 
provisions of which are not already well settled, needs to be looked at in 
light of Bill C-32‘s proposed amendments to modernize the Copyright Act.  
The following parts discuss the impact of the ACTA legal framework on the 
Canadian copyright law.  
 
A. Civil Enforcement 
 
Civil enforcement is covered under the second chapter of ACTA, which 
also deals with the legal framework of criminal and technological 
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as with border measures.  
The civil enforcement section in ACTA includes granting judicial 
authorities in member states the ability to issue desist orders against 
infringement and to issue orders to keep the infringing goods outside the 
channels of commerce.
55
  Further, the treaty would provide courts with the 
authority to order the infringer to pay the rights holders all the profit 
ensuing from the infringement.
56
  Amongst the factors that the court may 
take into consideration when evaluating damages are the profit made from 
the infringement, the market price of the infringed goods or services, and 
                                         
54
 See, Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va.J.Int‘l L. 369 at 
pp.373-374 (1997). (Noting that the digital agenda which the United States officials sought 
to adopt in the diplomatic conference in Geneva that led to the conclusion of WIPO 
Internet was almost identical to the digital agenda they had unsuccessfully sought to pass 
by the Congress, meaning that the U.S. officials tried to have ―an end run around 
Congress‖). 
55
  ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.X; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.1,  art.2.X. 
56
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(a)(ii). 
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the suggested sale price.
 57
  These requirements of ACTA are not expected 
to have a large impact on Canadian copyright law.  The Copyright Act now 
provides rights holders with a wide range of remedies that include what 
ACTA would ask for. Copyright owners whose rights have been infringed 
are entitled to ―all remedies,‖ including injunctions, compensatory and 
punitive damages, account of profits and delivery up of infringing goods.
58
  
One of the major obligations that ACTA would impose on the copyright 
laws of its members is the requirement of establishing a system of statutory 
damages.
59
  Under this regime, copyright statutes provide rights holders 
with the option to claim from infringers a certain amount of damages, not 
going beyond or falling below the range determined by the statute, for each 
work infringed.  The underlying policy behind this regime is to overcome 
the economic and evidentiary hurdles that right holders face in proving 
actual damages.
60
  The system of statutory damages has been described as 
―frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly 
excessive.‖
61
  While some of the countries negotiating ACTA have a system 
of statutory damages, such as the U.S. and Canada,
62
 others do not, and will 
need to amend their relevant laws to give effect to this provision.
63
  The 
Canadian Copyright Act has a statutory damages regime, which can be 
elected as an alternative to damages and an account of profits.
64
  The current 
range of statutory damages it sets is between $500 and $20,000.  When the 
                                         
57
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1)(b). 
58
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 34.(1).  Section 35(1) provides that the copyright 
owner can ask for both damages and account of profits. 
59
  ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(2); ACTA July Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(3);  
60
 Telewizja Polsat S.A. v. Radiopol Inc., 2006 FC 584, 52 C.P.R. (4th) 445, [2007] 1 
F.C.R. 444, 292 F.T.R. 195 (Eng.) at para.40.; ELIZABETH F. JUDGE & DANIEL 
GERVAIS, INTELLECTUAL PROEPRTY: THE LAW IN CANADA, (2005); Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 510. (2009).  
61
 see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 441 (2009) 
62
 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c). 
63
 E.g., Australia and New Zealand, see Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Analysis of the January Consolidated Text (Apr.2010), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweatherall. 
64
 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 38.1 provides ―(1) Subject to this section, a 
copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, 
instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an award of statutory 
damages for all infringements involved in the proceedings, with respect to any one work or 
other subject-matter, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any 
two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $500 or 
more than $20,000 as the court considers just.‖ Bill C-32 would lower the range of 
statutory damages for non-commercial uses to a ceiling of $5,000 and a floor of $100. Bill 
C-32, supra note X at s. 46. 
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court is convinced that the defendant was unaware of the infringement or 
had no reasonable grounds to believe that they were infringing copyrights, 
the court may reduce the minimum of the statutory damages to $200 per 
work.
65
  In special cases, the Copyright Act allows courts to reduce the 
statutory damages awarded below the stated minimums ($500 and $200), 
when the infringement involves more than one work in one single medium 
and at the same time when the awarding of these minimums would be 
―grossly out of proportion to the infringement.‖
 66
  These flexibilities that 
the Copyright Act provides in its statutory damages system would not 
conflict with ACTA obligations, for the treaty does not specify the details of 
the statutory damages it proposes.  Further, these flexibilities are in 
harmony with a proposed provision in the treaty suggesting that the adopted 
measures with respect to civil enforcement shall be ―fair and equitable‖
67 
 




The civil enforcement section in ACTA further provides that infringers, 
who knowingly infringe or have reasonable ground to know that they are 
infringing, will be required to pay right holder damages for the infringement 
in the amount of the harm sustained by the rights holders.
69
  The July draft 
overcame the fear that innocent infringement may be targeted by this 
provision, which was a possibility in light of the proposals in the official 
draft.
70
  However, the treaty would still cover infringement even when it is 
non-commercial in nature, a fact that sheds doubt on one of the stated 
underlying justifications of the treaty, which is to combat large-scale piracy.  
Even if the ACTA targeted innocent infringers, this would not cause any 
noncompliance concerns for Canadian copyright law.  Although the 
Copyright Act takes into consideration the knowledge or intention of the 
infringer in certain instances, such as in awarding criminal penalties and for 
certain remedies,
 
Canadian copyright law as a general rule does not treat 
innocent infringement differently from infringement.  The Act makes it an 
infringement to do, without the consent of the right holder, any of the 
exclusive rights granted to rights holders under the Act.
71
  Knowledge of the 
                                         
65
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 38.1(2). 
66
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 38.1(3). 
67
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, art.2.X(2). 
68
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, art.2.X(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  
ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(4) (discusses proportionality under the section of civil enforcement). It is 
still unclear whether this will be applicable to the whole legal framework proposed in 
chapter 1 of the treaty or merely to the civil and criminal enforcement sections. 
69
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1). 
70
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1)(a). 
71
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.27(1). 
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infringement or intention to infringe is not a condition to finding that 
infringement of copyright has been established.  In fact, Canadian courts 
have treated ―unconscious copying‖ as infringement.
72
  Innocent 
infringement does limit the plaintiff‘s remedies:  if the defendant was not 
aware and had not reasonable ground for suspecting there was copyright, 
damages are not available and the plaintiff is entitled only to an 
injunction.
73
  This limitation does not apply if copyright is registered.  
Further, as noted above for statutory damages, the court may reduce the 
minimum award for statutory damages to $200 for innocent infringement.
74
  
Other remedies speculated by the civil enforcement section include granting 
courts the authority to award rights holder prevailing in the civil procedure 
costs, fees and attorney‘s fees,
75
 which is in harmony with the provisions of 
the Canadian Copyright Act.
76
  Furthermore, the civil remedies may include 
destroying the infringing goods
77
 and destroying the materials essentially 
used in the making of the infringing goods, or taking them out of the 
channel of commerce.
78
  The Copyright Act grants rights holders the right 
to recover the infringing copies, to issue an order for their seizure, and for 
destruction of the infringing copies..
79
 
Finally, ACTA provides that infringers may be required to submit 
information on the source of the infringing goods and the individuals 
involved in any aspect of the infringement.
80
  The Canadian Copyright Act 
will need to be amended to accommodate the information-based remedies 
that ACTA provides.  In other words, the Act needs to incorporate the 
ACTA requirement by giving courts the authority to oblige infringers to 
disclose information with respect to the source of the copyright-infringing 




                                         
72
 Gondos v. Hardy (1982), 64 C.P.R. (2d) 145 (Ont. H.C.); see ELIZABETH F. 
JUDGE & DANIEL GERVAIS, INTELLECTUAL PROEPRTY: THE LAW IN 
CANADA, (2005). 
73
 Copyright Act, supra X, s. 39. 
74
 Copyright Act, supra X, s. 38(2), (3) and (5). 
75
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(5). 
76
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.34(3) 
77
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(1) 2.3(1). 
78
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(2). 
79
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.38(1) and 38(2) 
80
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.4. 
81
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.1, art.2.4. 
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B. Criminal Enforcement 
 
The section of ACTA on criminal enforcement obliges member states 
to criminalize at least ―willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or 
related rights piracy on a commercial scale.‖
82
  Under the official draft, 
with respect to copyright and related rights piracy, it was proposed that 
the ―commercial scale‖ requirement for criminalization is satisfied not 
only when piracy is for the purpose of ―financial gain or commercial 
advantage,‖ but also when it is ―significant‖ and ―willful,‖ even if it does 
not have ―direct or indirect motivation of financial gain.
83
  The July draft, 
however, has a different proposal, which suggests that the commercial 
scale requirement is satisfied only when the infringing/piracy acts are 
―carried out in the context of commercial activity for direct or indirect 
economic or commercial‖ use.
84
  This section is not likely to require 
Canada to modify its current treatment to criminal remedies under its 
copyright law regime given that the Copyright Act already includes a list 
of copyright-infringing activities that would cover ACTA‘s requirements 
to criminalize willful copyright or related rights piracy.  Section 42(1) of 
the Copyright Act criminalizes certain intentional and commercial 
copyright infringing activities, including making, selling, renting, offering 
for sale or rent, exhibiting in public, and importing into Canada an 
infringing copy of a copyrighted work or other copyrighted subject 
matter.
85
  The Canadian Copyright Act may actually go beyond the July 
draft and comply with the wider scope of criminalization available in the 
official draft of ACTA, which provided that the ―commercial scale‖ 
requirement for criminalizing piracy could be satisfied when it is 
―significant‖ and ―willful‖ even if it does not involve a commercial 
activity or does not have ―direct or indirect motivation of financial 
gain‖.
86
  The Canadian Copyright Act, similarly, criminalizes the 
distribution of infringing copies for commercial purposes or ―to such an 
extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright.‖
87
  
The penalties that the criminal enforcement section in ACTA may 
require member states to impose for crimes and offences include 
                                         
82
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3.14(1) leak. ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1). 
83
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  ch.2, s.3, art.2.14 (a)(b). 
84
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1) leak. 
85
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.42.(1)(a)(b)(d)(e). 
86
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  ch.2, s.3, art.2.14 (a)(b). 
87
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42.(1)(c) 
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imprisonment and monetary fines.
88
  The infringing goods would be 
subject to seizure,  forfeiture and destruction.
89
  Correspondingly, a person 
found guilty of committing any of the section 42(1) offences is liable 
under the Canadian Copyright Act ―on summary conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months or to both, or [] on conviction on indictment, to a 
fine not exceeding one million dollars or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years or to both.‖
90
  Moreover, the Copyright Act subjects 
the infringing copies to destruction or delivery up.
91
  
Since ACTA allows member states to exempt end consumers from 
criminal liability when receiving pirated copies,
 92
 the Copyright Act‘s 
silence with respect to the criminal liability of end consumers would not 
render the Canadian Copyright Act non-compliant with the ACTA.  
Canadian copyright law also complies with the obligation to criminalize 
the unauthorized recording of a movie,
93
 since Canada amended its 
Criminal Code in 2007 to include this offence.
94
 
There are some areas where ACTA may require some modification to 
the Copyright Act‘s treatment of criminal remedies.  While the treaty may 
have a provision, suggested by the EU, requiring countries to adopt 
measures to ―establish the liability of legal persons‖ for the said 
offences,
95
 the Copyright Act does not have criminal liability for 
corporations.  Also,  ACTA would possibly, under the EU suggestion, 
criminalize inciting, aiding and abetting the offences mentioned in the 
criminal enforcement section of ACTA.
96
  However, the Copyright Act 
does not have a provision covering these proposed offences.  One more 
important obligation that the criminal enforcement section in ACTA 
speculates is to require member states to provide their competent 
                                         
88
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3,  art.2.15; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.3,  art.2.15(3) 
89
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  ch.2, s.3,  art.2.16.; ACTA July Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.3,  art. 2.16. 
90
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42.(1)(f)(g). 
91
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42(3). 
92
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1) leak. 
93
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X  ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(3); ACTA July Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.3,  art.2.14(3). The EU and Singapore suggested deleting this provision. 
94
 Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 432, Department of Justice Canada 
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-46///en?page=1>; R.S.C, 1985, c. 27 (1st 
Supp.), s. 58; 2007, c. 28, s. 1. 
95
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X, ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(4); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.3,  art.2.15(1). 
96
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X,  ch.2, s.3,  art.15(2); 2.14(3) EU suggestion. 
Please note that the subsection here confusingly has the same number of the subsection 
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authorities with ex officio criminal enforcement, enabling criminal 
procedures to be initiated without having to be predicated on a complaint 
from rights holders.
97
  Since Canadian authorities have no ex officio 
competence under the copyright law with respect to investigating and 
prosecuting offences pertinent to copyright infringement, ACTA may 
require Canada to reexamine its position with respect to this matter.
98
   
 
C. Border Measures 
 
The border measures section in ACTA deals with member states‘ 
authority with respect to goods that are suspected of infringing intellectual 
property rights when they are imported, exported, in transit, or under 
custom supervision.
99
  While infringement of all forms of intellectual 
property is covered under this section as a rule,  there is a possibility for 
an exception allowing member states to exclude certain forms of 
intellectual property rights, other than copyright, trademarks, and 
geographical indications, from these measures.
100
  The scope of this 
exception and what rights may fall under it is very controversial.  
The border measures section includes a de minimis provision that 
would allow member states to exclude goods that are non-commercial in 
quantity and nature and contained in travellers‘ baggage (or ―sent in small 
consignment‖) from the actions described in this section.
101
  This 
exception is intended to overcome the fear that ACTA would subject 
travellers‘ baggage, portable computers, and portable media recorders to 
inspection for copyright-infringing materials.  The section is likely to have 
a provision that requires member states to provide procedures enabling 
right holders to ask custom authorities to suspend the release of goods 
suspected of intellectual property infringement.
102
  It is not obvious 
whether the scope of this measure may be limited only to ―pirated 
                                                                                                       
requiring the criminalization of camcording. 
97
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X, ch.2, s.3, art.2.17; ACTA July Draft, supra note 
X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17. 
98
 ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17; ACTA July Draft, supra note 
X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17. 
99
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2,  art.2.x(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.x(1). 
100
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2,  art.2.x(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.x(2) official.  
101
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.X; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2,  art. 2.X. 
102
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.6; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.6. 
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copyright works‖ or ―counterfeit trademarks goods‖ or will extend to 
cover ―intellectual property infringement‖ in general.  It is also not clear 
whether the measure will be limited to shipments for ―import‖ or may 
extend to cover export and in transit shipments.  All these options are 
possible according to the current draft.
103
  There is a possibility under the 
draft to grant custom authorities ex officio authority (―may act upon their 
own initiative‖ without any request from right holders) to take the 
measure of suspending the release of the suspected infringing goods.
104
  
The section includes a provision asking member states to give its 
authorities the power to request a reasonable security from right holders 
in order to protect the defendant and authorities from any abuse of 
procedures by right holders.
105
  The draft gives custom authorities the 
ability to decide whether the suspended goods suspected of infringement 
are truly infringing or not.
106
  Upon finding infringement, authorities may 
order the destruction of the goods, or if the goods are not destroyed, some 
countries have suggested that the goods be kept ―outside the channels of 
commerce.‖
107
  To indentify infringing shipments, but without prejudice to 
the countries‘ law of privacy and confidential information, authorities may 




Canada‘s Copyright Act includes some provisions on border measures.  
The Act prohibits certain acts of secondary infringement, including the 
importation of copies that would have infringed copyright if they had been 
made in Canada.
109
  The Copyright Act has procedural mechanisms for the 
copyright owner or exclusive licensee to apply for a court order to stop 
copies and related rights material at the border that would constitute 
secondary infringement by importation.
110
  However, the more expansive 
                                         
103
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.6; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2,art.2.6. 
104
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.7; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.7. 
105
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2,  art.2.9; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.9. 
106
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2,  art.2.10; ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.10. 
107
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2,  art.2.11; ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X  ch.2, s.2,  art.2.11. 
108
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.13; ACTA Official Draft, supra note 
X  ch.2, s.2, art.2.13. 
109
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 27(2). 
110
  Copyright Act, supra note X, ss. 44, 44.2 and 44.4. Section 45 provides exceptions 
for individuals, government, libraries, archives, museums, and educational institutions to 
import copies if the relevant copyright owner where they were made consented and also 
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provisions of ACTA for border measures are not included in the current 
statute, and thus ACTA is expected to have a conspicuous impact on 
Canadian copyright law in this domain.  The border measures 
requirements that ACTA is proposing, such as granting custom authorities 
with ex officio authority, would be highly disruptive of established user 
rights and exceptions under Canadian copyright law, such as fair dealing, 
where the complex nature of the inquiry demands that the proper preserve 




D. Enforcement in the Digital Environment 
 
The ACTA section of enforcement in the digital environment is highly 
bracketed.
112
  There is still no agreement whether the rights covered under 
this section are all ―intellectual property rights‖ or only ―trademarks and 
copyright and related rights.‖  The section requires providing the same 
civil and criminal enforcement to intellectual property rights (or 
trademarks and copyright and related rights) against infringements in the 
digital environment or carried out by the internet.
113
  There is a suggestion 
by the EU, Switzerland, and New Zealand for a provision stating that the 
digital environment enforcement measures need to be ―fair and 
proportionate.‖
114
  These countries also suggest that this provision be 
moved to section ―A‖ of the first chapter and, therefore, be applicable to 
the whole treaty.
115
  The enforcement in the digital environment deals with 
four major issues that are expected to impact Canadian copyright law.  
 
1. Third Party Liability 
 
The digital enforcement section of ACTA requires members states to 
establish a system of third party liability which makes anyone who 
―authorizes for a direct financial benefit,  induces through or by conduct 
                                                                                                       
provides exceptions for used books (excluding textbooks) to be imported. 
111
 Michael Geist, ACTA Emergency Communique: Add Your Name Today (Jun.21, 
2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5134/125/.; International Experts Find that 
Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests (Jun. 23, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique. 
112
 Canada has reserved its position on this section. 
113
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1);  ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1). 
114
  ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(2); ACTA July Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.4,  art.2.18(1). 
115
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4,  art.2.18(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra 
note X ch.2, s.4, footnote 46. 
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directed to promoting infringement, or knowingly and materially aids any 




  The 
treaty would subject individuals violating this by means of these acts to 
the civil remedies available under this section, without prejudice to the 
exception and limitations available under the laws of the relevant 
country.
117
  This provision presents an example where ACTA goes beyond 
its purpose as an enforcement treaty to a treaty providing substantive 
rights over intellectual property, especially given that the third-party 
liability regime has no foundations in the international intellectual 
property regime.
118
  Still,  there is no agreement on the scope of the rights 
covered under this provision and to which of the intellectual property 
rights—patent, industrial design, trademark and copyright or related 
rights—it applies. 
ACTA‘s treatment of third-party liability is problematic. The ACTA 
definition of third-party liability is troubling for the Canadian copyright 
law.  It provides legal remedies in cases where the Canadian law does not 
establish infringement or award remedies.   For example, unlike the 
situation in the U.S,
119
 which distinguishes vicarious and contributory 
infringement and recognizes that someone who does not directly infringe 
copyright may nevertheless infringe by contributing or encouraging 
infringement, under Canadian copyright law there is the single concept of 
secondary infringement which does not expressly include mere 
contribution to infringement.  Current Canadian law also does not include 
inducement-based infringement.  This situation would change if Bill C-32 
passes since it provides: 
 
                                         
116
 It is proposed that the definition third party liability be as follows: ―third party 
liability means liability for any person who authorizes for a direct financial benefit, induces 
through or by conduct directed to promoting infringement, or knowingly and materially 
aids any act of copyright or related rights infringement by another. Further, the Parties also 
understand that the application of third party liability may include consideration of 
exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights that are confined to certain special cases that 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, performance or phonogram, and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, including fair use, 
fair dealing, or their equivalents.‖. See ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4,  footnote 
46; ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, footnote 47. 
117
 (2.18.3); ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4,  art.2.18(2). 
118
 Library Copyright Alliance, Concerns with April 2010 ACTA Text (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/consolidatedtextcomments423.pdf. 
119
 E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.545 U.S. 913 (2005);  
ARISTA RECORDS LLC, et. al, v. LIME GROUP LLC et al., (Case 1:06-cv-05936-
KMW Document 216 Filed 05/11/201); COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., et 
al.,v. GARY FUNG, et al. (Case 2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC Document 391 Filed 
12/21/2009). 
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(2.3) It is an infringement of copyright for a person to provide, by 
means of the Internet or another digital network, a service that the 
person knows or should have known is designed primarily to enable 
acts of copyright infringement if an actual infringement of copyright 
occurs by means of the Internet or another digital network as a result of 




Under Canadian law, the statutory right to authorize the rights holder‘s 
exclusive rights is an autonomous right that is separate from the 
performance of those acts.
121
  Infringement cases involving a third party 
providing technologies or tools by which infringement takes place could 
be covered under the notion of infringement by means of ―authorization,‖ 
which is a primary type of infringement rather than secondary, and has a 
different meaning than the meanings afforded to it in other jurisdictions.  
It breaches the authorization right of copyright holders embodied in 
section 3(1) of the Copyright Act.  The Supreme Court of Canada had the 
chance to clarify the meaning of ―authorization‖ under the Copyright Act 
in two leading cases. 
In CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada,
122
 the 
Supreme Court addressed whether a library providing photocopying 
services to its users amounted to authorizing these users to infringe the 
copyrights of some of the publishers of the resources available in the 
library.  The Supreme Court held that such activity did not ―constitute 
authorization to use the photocopiers to breach copyright law.‖
123
  The 
Supreme Court added:  ―[A] person does not authorize copyright 
infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment (such as 
photocopiers) that could be used to infringe copyright.  In fact, courts 
should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so 
far as it is in accordance with the law. ‖
124
  The Supreme Court identified 
the meaning of ―authorization‖ as to ―[g]ive approval to; sanction, 
permit; favour, encourage.‖
125
  Further it held that the Law Society did 
not have enough control over the users of the library to have ―sanctioned, 
approved or countenanced the infringement.‖
126
 
                                         
120
 Bill C-32, supra note X, ss. 27(2.3). 
121
 Copyright Act, supra note X, ss. 3 and 27.  
122
 CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 
[hereinafter CCH ]. 
123
 CCH, supra note X at para.42 
124
 CCH, supra note X at para.43. 
125
 CCH, supra note X at para.38 
126
 CCH, supra note X at para.45. 
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In Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada,
127
 the Supreme 
Court concluded that ISPs were not liable to pay a tariff to a collective 
society for  for the communication of musical works in the collective‘s 
repertoire over the internet and found, in part,  that ISPs were not 
―authorizing‖ copyright infringement.  The Supreme Court held that 
―when massive amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to the 
end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service Provider, 
based solely on the provision of Internet facilities, an authority to 
download copyrighted material as opposed to non-copyrighted 
material.‖
128
  The Court followed the teachings of CCH
129
 that the 
knowledge that people may be engaged in copyright infringement by 
means of a neutral or dual-use technology (such as a photocopier in the 
library) did not constitute authorization of copyright infringement.
130
  The 
Court held that to find authorization the defendants must have ―approved, 
sanctioned, permitted, favoured or encouraged‖ the infringement.
131
 
ACTA would thus introduce to Canada a notion of third-party liability 
that is not in harmony with the status quo of the Canadian copyright law. 
 
2. ISPs Safe Harbor 
 
The third-party liability system in ACTA obliges (allows according to 
Switzerland) member states to adopt a system limiting the civil liability of 
internet service providers (hereinafter ISPs).  The treaty speculates a 
provision that would have ―a safe harbour‖
132
-like effect on ISPs‘ 
liability.
133
  The July draft slightly overcomes some of the confusion that 
ISP liability issue raises in the official draft.   The section would limit ISP 
liability at least for copyright or related rights infringements in three 
circumstances.  First,  ISP liability is limited, when the infringement of a 
copyright or a related right takes place by ―automatic technical process
134
 
as part of the transmission of material when the online service provider 
                                         
127
 Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers v Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2004 SCC 45 [Tariff 22 case]. 
128
 SOCAN 123. 
129
 CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 
[hereinafter CCH ]. 
130
 Tariff 22 case, supra  note X at para. 123&124. 
131
 Tariff 22 case, supra  note X at para.127. 
132
 17 U.S.C.A. § 512. 
133
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art. 2.18(3). 
134
 ―Japan is proposing that this technical process makes the ISP unable to prevent the 
infringement‖ 
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did not initiate the transmission, did not select or modify the material, and 
did not select the recipient of the material.‖
135
  In other words,  this 
exception protects an ISP from liability that may ensue from its function 
as ―conduit‖  or ―channel‖ for transmitting the infringing materials.  
Second, ISP liability is limited when the infringement of a copyright 
or a related right takes place by ―the automatic, intermediate, and 
temporary storage of material made available online by a person other 
than the online service provider and transmitted by the online service 
provider to its users without modification of the material.‖
 136
  In other 
words, the ISP is exempted from liability for its caching activities.  This 
exception is limited by a ―notice and take down‖ burden whereby an 
ISP‘s immunity is conditioned upon ―expeditiously
137
 removing or 
disabling access to material upon receipt of a legally sufficient notice of 
alleged infringement concerning material that has previously been 
removed from the originating site.‖
 138
  
Third, ISP liability is limited when the infringement of a copyright or 
a related right takes place by ―storage of material provided by a user of 
the online service provider.‖
139
  This paragraph exempts an ISP from the 
legal liability that may ensue from hosting infringing material. Canada, 
the U.S, and the EU are in favour of extending this provision to exempt 
―referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing 
material or activity.‖
140
  The whole provision of the hosting exception is 
not finalized:  it is still bracketed.  The applicability of the hosting, 
referring or linking exemption is possibly to be conditioned upon the ISP 
not receiving financial gain directly attributable to the infringement; the 
ISP expeditiously removing the content or disabling the access to it once it 
has actual knowledge of the infringement (through a legal notice for 
example) or reasonable ground to be aware of it; and the ISP not being 
aware of a court decision holding that the hosted material is infringing.
141
 
In providing ISPs with immunity under this section, countries cannot 
impose an obligation on ISPs to assume a monitoring activity while 
                                         
135
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(i). 
136
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(ii). 
137
 Canada is suggesting to add ―or within a definite period of time‖ after the word 
―expeditiously.‖ Japan is suggesting more restrictive language that requires the ISP to take 
down the content once it knows or has reasonable grounds to about the infringement.  
138
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(b). 
139
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(iii). 
140
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(iii). 
141
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(c) 





Japan is proposing a provision requiring member states to grant their 
judicial authorities the ability to order an ISP to release the information of 
the relevant subscriber to the right holders when right holders have made 
a legal and reasonable claim that the subscriber has infringed their 
rights.
143
  It is also proposing a provision speculating the establishment of 
guidelines between ISPs and right holders with respect to ―dealing 
effectively‖ with infringement of IP rights on the internet.
144
  The ISP 
liability regime under ACTA does not adopt the so called ―graduated 
response or three strike‖ sanction, a measure whereby ISPs punish their 
customers who have been warned three times that their online activities is 
suspected of infringing copyrights by cutting their internet service.  This 
measure is available in South Korea, France, and Taiwan.
145
 
Under Canadian copyright law, by the nature of their functions, ISPs 
find themselves involved in communicating and temporarily reproducing 
copyrighted works or copyright infringing content and authorizing such 
acts.
146
  These activities render ISPs vulnerable to liability under copyright 
law for primary or secondary infringement of copyright.
147
  The Canadian 
Copyright Act does not have a comprehensive treatment of ISPs liability, 
although the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the provision 
exempting passive conduits from infringement of the rights holder‘s right 
to communicate to the public by telecommunication applies to certain 
activities of ISPs.
148
  In SOCAN,  the Supreme Court concluded that ―the 
Copyright Act, as a matter of legislative policy established by Parliament, 
does not impose liability for infringement on intermediaries who supply 
software and hardware to facilitate use of the Internet.‖
149
  The Supreme 
Court found that ISPs benefit from the immunity provided by section 
2.4(1)(b)
150
 when they purely act as a ―conduit‖ for communication to the 
                                         
142
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.3 bis. 
143
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art. 3.ter. 
144
 ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.3 quarter. 
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 Gwen Hinze,Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text(Apr.22, 
2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-officially-released-acta-text. 
146
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.3.(1). 
147
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 27. (1)(2)., see also, Andrew Bernstein & Rima 
Ramchandani, Don’t Shoot the Messenger! A Discussion of ISP Liability,  1 CJLT 77, at 
p.82(2002); SHERYL N. HAMILTON, Made in Canada: A Unique Approach to Internet 
Service Provider Liability and Copyright Infringement, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 285, 289 (Michael Geist ed., 2005). 
148
 Consultation Paper on Digital Copyright Issues (Jun. 22, 2001),  
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/vwapj/digital.pdf/$FILE/digital.pdf, at p. 30. 
149
 SOCAN, supra  note X at para.101. 
150
 Copyright Act, supra note X, s.2.4(1)(b),  ―a person whose only act in respect of the 
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public and do not ―engage in acts that relate to the content of the 
communication.‖
151
  The Supreme Court added that section 2.4(1)(b) ―is 
not a loophole but an important element of the balance struck by the 
statutory copyright scheme.‖
152
  The Court held that ―a lack of actual 
knowledge of the infringing contents, and the impracticality (both 
technical and economic) of monitoring the vast amount of material moving 
through the Internet, which is prodigious‖ are distinguishing qualities of 
an ISP having the status of a ―conduit.‖
153
  To benefit from section 
2.4(1)(b), the means which the ISP provides must be ―necessary‖: the 
Supreme Court explained that ―[i]n context, the word ―necessary‖ in s. 
2.4(1)(b) is satisfied if the means are reasonably useful and proper to 
achieve the benefits of enhanced economy and efficiency.‖
154
  The 
Supreme Court confirmed that only an ISP‘s function as an intermediary 
or conduit is exempted from liability by means of section 2.4(1)(b).  This 
immunity ceases to exist when an ISP‘s activities ―cease to be content 
neutral‖ and thus does not apply to non-intermediary roles by an ISP, 
such as being content providers.
155
  
With respect to the issue of ―caching,‖ the Supreme Court held that 
―[t]he creation of a ‗cache‘ copy, after all,  is a serendipitous consequence 
of improvements in Internet technology, is content neutral, and in light of 
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act ought not to have any legal bearing on the 
communication between the content provider and the end user.‖
156
  It 
added, that ―‗[c]aching‘ is dictated by the need to deliver faster and more 
economic service,  and should not, when undertaken only for such 
technical reasons, attract copyright liability.‖
157
  Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court hinted, in dictum, that ―notice of infringing content, and a 
failure to respond by ―taking it down‖ may in some circumstances lead to 
a finding of ―authorization,‖ which constitutes primary infringement.
158
  
The Supreme Court stated that a solution to this issue lies in legislation 
that includes a ―notice and take down‖ system.
159
  This suggestion does 
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not reflect the practice that ISs are engaged with respect to allegations of 
copyright infringement by their subscribers.  Outside courts, ISPs are 
voluntarily committed to a ―notice and notice‖ system to deter copyright 
infringements through the services of ISPs.  Under this systems right 
holders can send a notice to the ISP complaining that specific ISP‘s 
subscribers are infringing upon their copyrights.
160
  Consequently, the ISP 
forwards this notice to the relevant subscribers advising them that they are 
abusing the ISP‘s services by engaging in allegedly copyright infringing 
activities.
 161
  The ISP would inform the subscribers with the details of the 
rights holders‘ allegations, and advice them to contact the complaining 
right holders.
 162
  Finally, the ISP would send a notice to the right holders 
indicating that the ISP has passed their notice to the relevant subscriber.
 163
  
The role of the ISP ends here; if the relevant subscriber does not comply 
with the notice and refrain from infringing copyright, rights holders 
would need to their options against the alleged infringers through the 
available means under the copyright law.
 164 
 This system has been proved 
effective in that ISPs notice a noticeable amount of alleged infringing 
content is removed voluntarily by the customers receiving these notices.
165
  
According to the former President of the Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers, Jay Thomson, the ―notice and notice‖ this system to is already 




With ACTA safe harbor provisions in mind, a look to ISP immunity 
under section s. 2.4(1)(b), under SOCAN,  and under the voluntary ―notice 
and notice‖ system leads to the following conclusions.  First,  Canada will 
need to codify its law with respect to liability of ISPs in order to comply 
with the requirements of ACTA.  Second, while practically Canadian law 
provides ISPs with a safe harbor with respect to their caching and hosting 
activities as well as their roles as ―channels‖ or ―conduits,‖ which are 
essentially the exceptions that ACTA requires member states to grant ISPs 
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to be immune against copyright liability, ACTA may require Canada to 
abandon its unique ―notice and notice‖ system, and legislatively adopt a 
―notice and take-down‖ system.  
Since Canada aims at reforming the ISP liability system in Phase 3 of 
its copyright reform process and includes such provisions in Bill C-32, it 
is interesting to see whether the provisions on ISP liability in this Bill will 
be compliant with the provisions of ACTA. Bill C-32 proposes 
amendments to clarify ISP liability.  It exempts ISPs when they are acting 
as pure ―intermediaries‖ with respect to their communication,
167
 when 
they practice caching for technical reasons,
168
 and when they host 
content.
169
  Further, Bill C-32 would codify the Canadian ―notice and 
notice‖ system to deal with online infringement activities.
170
  While an ISP 
is not required to remove allegedly infringing content, it is required to 
retain the relevant subscriber‘s information for six months or for a year if 
the matter is litigated.
171
 It is clear that Bill C-32 would comply with 
ACTA with respect to its ISPs safe harbor provisions; however, its system 
of ―notice and notice‖ would conflict with the ACTA.  
 
3. The Protection of Technological Protection Measures 
 
ACTA would require member states to provide legal protection to 
technological protection measures (TPMs) and rights management 
information (RMI). The inclusion of this obligation in ACTA is 
unjustified given the presence of another international legal framework for 
the protection of TPMs and RMI in the WIPO Copyright Treaty
172
 and 
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty
173
 (WIPO Internet Treaties).   
Furthermore, protecting TPMs and RMI does not comply with the 
claimed purpose of ACTA as an enforceability treaty, as these provisions 
are considered to be another layer of copyright protection:  differently 
put, they create new substantive rights.   
The section in the official draft received more refinement in July draft.  
Accordingly, the ACTA July draft prohibits the circumvention of an 
access control TPM, but it does not mandate the prohibition of 
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circumventing copy control TPM.
 174
  Nevertheless, it prohibits trafficking 
in all TPMs‘ circumvention-enabling tools.
175
  Unlike, the official draft,  
the July draft does not specify that criminal remedies would be available 
against individuals circumventing TPMs or RMI.  
The treaty would allow member states to provide exceptions to the 
provisions prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs or rights information 
management, provided that these exceptions would not impair the legal 
protection provided to TPMs or the remedies available against their 
circumvention.
176
  However, the circumvention of TPMs is prohibited 
even if access is sought for a purpose allowed under the law. Japan is of 
the opinion that the anti-circumvention prohibition applies ―without 




Canada has a long story with the protection of TPMs.  In 1996, 
Canada signed both the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)
178
 and the WIPO 
Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).
179
  These two treaties 
include provisions that would, inter alia, oblige member states to ―provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of‖ TPMs and RMI.
180
  Canada has not ratified these 
treaties yet; thus, the Canadian Copyright Act remains without anti-
circumvention provisions.  The Canadian Government‘s task to amend the 
Copyright Act to accommodate the provisions of the WIPO Internet 
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Treaties has proven difficult.   Two attempts for reform failed: the first 
was the 2005 Bill C-60 and the second was the 2008 Bill C-61. In June 
2010, the Canadian Government took another attempt, the success of 
which is still to be seen, by tabling Bill C-32 to amend the copyright to 
give effect to the WIPO internet treaties and modernize the Copyright Act 
in light of internet ―challenges and opportunities.‖
181
  While Bill C-32 
includes anti-circumvention provisions that are supposed to bring Canada 
into compliance with its obligations under the WIPO Internet Treaties, the 
country‘s engagement in ACTA, where anti-circumvention rules are being 
negotiated, adds the question of whether or not the proposed Bill would 
satisfy the requirements of protecting TPMs and RMI under the ACTA. 
Bill C-32 regulates the protection of technological protection measures 
which would add new sections 41 et seq to the Copyright Act.  The 
section starts by defining ―technological protection measure‖ as ―any 
effective technology, device or component that,  in the ordinary course of 
its operation, (a) controls access to a work, to a performer‘s performance 
fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is 
authorized by the copyright owner; or (b) restricts the doing—with respect 
to a work, to a performer‘s performance fixed in a sound recording or to 
a sound recording—of any act referred to in section 3, 15 or 18 and any 
act for which remuneration is payable under section 19.‖  This definition 
categorizes a TPM according to the purpose it serves in a copyrighted 
work or protected subject matter as an ―access control TPM‖ that 
prevents unauthorised access to the work or subject matter and a ―copy 
control TPM‖ which limits certain uses of the copyrighted work or 
subject matter. The scope of the technological mechanisms that fall under 
the definition of ―circumvention‖ varies according to whether 
circumvention is directed against a copy-control TPM or an access-control 
TPM.  Accordingly, circumvention of a copy-control TPM is ―to avoid, 
bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the [TPM],‖ whereas the 
circumvention of an access-control TPM includes in addition to that list of 
prohibited activities ―descrambling a scrambled or decrypting an 
encrypted work.‖  The definition of a TPM in Bill C-32 is similar to the 
definition of a TPM under the provisions of ACTA; it includes both 
access-control and copy-control TPMs.
182
  
Bill C-32 prohibits the circumvention of an access-control TPM, not a 
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  This justifies the earlier distinction in definition 
between an access-control TPM and a copy–control TPM.  Similarly, 
ACTA obliges member states to outlaw the circumvention of access-
control TPMs, but leaves it optional to these countries to prohibit copy-
control TPMs.  This is the view of EU, Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, 
Morocco, and Australia.
184
  On the other hand, the U.S continues to 
advocate for extending the prohibition against circumvention to protect 
both types of TPMs.
185
  Both Bill C-32 and ACTA prohibit trafficking in 
circumvention tools targeting both types of TPMs; however, the scope of 
the  acts that qualify as trafficking under Bill C-32 is wider than its 
counterpart under ACTA.  The bill prohibits offering or providing 
services to the public in three cases:  if these services are mainly targeting 
circumventing TPMs, if they are marketed as such, or if they have no 
commercial value other than when used for purposes of TPMs‘ 
circumvention.
186
  The prohibition extends to cover dealing with 
circumvention technologies, tools and components by means of 
manufacturing, importing, distributing, providing, offering for sale or 
renting, selling or renting in three cases:  when the technology, device, or 
component is mainly made for the purpose of circumventing TPMs, if it is 
marketed as such, or if it has no significant value but for the purpose of 
circumventing TPMs.
187
  In contrast,  the prohibited trafficking acts under 
ACTA are: manufacturing, importation, distribution, and (maybe offering 
to distribute),
188
 ―a device that has predominant function of circumventing 
an effective technological measure and that is .  .  .  marketed for the 
purpose of circumventing an effective technological measure; primarily 
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing an effective 
technological measure; or has only a limited commercially significant 
purpose other than circumventing an effective technological measure.‖
189
  
In other words, even if distribution under ACTA is understood as 
enclosing ―renting and selling,‖ Bill C-32 provides additionally prohibits 
―offering or providing services‖ of circumvention to the public.
190
  More 
importantly, the terminology used to refer to circumvention tools the 
trafficking in which is prohibited under Bill C-32 is more inclusive than 
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the terminology used in ACTA.  Bill C-32 prohibits trafficking in 
circumvention technologies, devices, or components, while ACTA 
prohibits trafficking in circumvention devices (the U.S is proposing to 
include a circumvention product).
191
 
Under Bill C-32 three categories of copyright subject matter are 
protected: copyrighted works, a performer‘s performance fixed in a sound 
recording, or a sound recording.  ACTA is the same:  it protects TPMs 




Bill C-32 has a bundle of exceptions pertinent to circumvention or 
trafficking in its enabling tools.  These exceptions are solely for the 
purposes of  facilitating law enforcement investigations and the protection 
of national security;
193
 making computer programs interoperable;
194
 doing 
encryption research; verifying and preventing the unauthorised collection 
of personal information;
195
 testing the reliability of the security of a 
computer, computer system, or computer network and fixing their 
flaws;
196
 making the work perceptible to the person with a perceptual 
disability;
197
 gaining access to a telecommunications service through the 
radio
198
 and making an ephemeral recording of protected work or subject 
matter in a broadcasting undertaking.
199
  These exceptions are not 
absolute.  The Bill provides that in some instances exceptions are not 
applicable:  namely, when they involve acts that may constitute copyright 
infringement or violation of any federal or provincial law,
200
 when they 
render the TPM ―unduly impair[ed],‖
201
 when they are done without the 
permission of the owner of the work or without the consent of the owner 
or administrator of the computer system,
202
 or when the individual 
benefiting from the exception has obtained the TPM-protected subject 
matter unlawfully.
203
  The exceptions to the circumvention of TPMs and 
trafficking in its enabling services and tools, taken with their constraints, 
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would not raise any noncompliance concerns with ACTA‘s anti-
circumvention provisions.  ACTA would allow member states to provide 
exceptions to the provisions prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs or 
rights information management, provided that ―they do not significantly 
impair the adequacy of legal protection of those [technological (according 
to Canadian proposal)] measures or the effectiveness of legal remedies for 
violations of those measures.‖
204
  
The exceptions provided in Bill C-32, nevertheless do not extend to 
allow the circumvention of TPMs for purposes otherwise allowed by 
Canadian copyright law, such as the right of fair dealing or private use.  
The question is whether an exception for a purpose like fair dealing would 
be compliant with ACTA. As a general rule, ACTA requires that 
circumvention be prohibited independent of copyright infringement.   
ACTA, however, allows exceptions provided that ―they do not 
significantly impair the adequacy of legal protection‖ provided to TPMs.   
Hence the fact that fair dealing is not infringement would not save an 
exception allowing the circumvention for fair dealing purposes since the 
treaty specifically provides that it is not a requirement for the prohibition 
to apply that circumvention result in copyright infringement.   
With respect to remedies, Bill C-32 provides both civil and criminal 
remedies against individuals involved in the prohibited circumvention 
activities.  Specifically, a rights holder is entitled to all remedies available 
under the law for copyright infringement against an individual who 
circumvents an access-control TPM,
205
 but cannot claim statutory damages 
against an individual circumventing an access-control TPM for personal 
use.
206
  Nevertheless, all remedies, including statutory damages, are 
available against individuals trafficking in anti-circumvention enabling 
tools or services.
207
  The court may reduce the damages awarded against 
innocent infringers,  who satisfy the court that they were unaware or did 
not have reasonable grounds to know that their acts were prohibited by 
this section.
208
  Where the defendant is a library, archive, or a museum 
and convinces the court that it did not know or had no reasonable grounds 
to know that its activities are infringing, the only remedy available for the 
plaintiff is injunction.
209
  Individuals acting on behalf of these institutions 
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are not subject to the criminal liability described in the Bill.
210
  Bill C-32 
subjects persons intentionally circumventing TPMs for commercial 
purposes to criminal penalties that may reach up to $ 1 million and/or 
imprisonment for five years.
211
 
While the official draft of ACTA included wording proposing the 
establishment of both civil and criminal liability against circumvention-
based prohibitions, the July draft no longer has this wording.  The latter 
merely obliges member countries to provide ―effective legal remedies‖ or 
―adequate legal protection,‖ which means that Bill C-32 goes beyond the 
requirements of the ACTA. 
The Bill also prohibits intentionally altering or removing ―rights 
management information,‖
212
 without the consent of the owner of the 
copyright in the work, if the person knew or should have known that the 
removal or alteration would facilitate or conceal copyright infringement or 
harm the right to equitable remuneration for public performance and 
communication to the public under section 19.
213
  The Bill makes liable 
anyone who knowingly and without the owner‘s consent distributes the 
work of which the rights management information has been removed or 
altered, sells, rents, or imports it into Canada for these purposes, or 
communicates it to the public by telecommunication.   Similarly, ACTA 
prohibits the circumvention of rights management information and 
prohibits the circulation of works of which the rights management 
information has been removed.  
It is important to note that if Bill C-32 fails to pass, Canada would 
expose itself to more pressure as a country not complying with its 




With the advent of ACTA, the snowball of the protection and 
enforceability of intellectual property rights will continue growing. 
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Canadians, like other citizens whose countries may adhere to this treaty, 
would notice major changes to the legal systems regulating their rights 
and obligations with respect to intellectual property.  With respect to 
copyright law, by deciding to be a party of ACTA, Canada would be 
facing a true challenge of fulfilling its international obligations and at the 
same time preserving its carefully drawn copyright law and policy.  This 
task, in light of the content of ACTA, is significant.   
 
